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**EFFECTS OF FIRM SIZE, AUDIT OPINION, AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY ON  
AUDITOR CHANGE IN INFRASTRUCTURE COMPANIES LISTED ON THE  
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**Abstract**

The importance of auditor independence in performing audit work has led many companies to change auditors to maintain their independence. This study aims to identify empirical evidence regarding factors that influence auditor turnover, such as firm size, financial condition, and audit opinions. This research is quantitative, with data sources drawn from the Indonesian scholarship. The population used was infrastructure companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange for the period 2017–2021. Thirty-one infrastructure companies served as the sample. The research sample was obtained using purposive sampling technique. The analytical method used was logistic regression analysis. The results showed that firm size, financial condition, and audit opinion do not influence auditor switching.

**Keywords:** Auditor Change, Firm Size, Audit Opinion, Financial Distress



## INTRODUCTION

Publicly traded companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) are required to publish and disclose their financial statements. According to Deliana et al. (2021), coupled with the rapid growth of listed companies and growing demand for audit services, there is a need to conduct audits by independent entities. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia released the number of audit firms operating in Indonesia on February 21, 2022, which reached 472 ([pppk.kemenkeu.go.id](http://pppk.kemenkeu.go.id)).

A structured presentation of a company's financial position and performance is the definition of financial reporting (PSAK, 2018). At the same time, the purpose of financial reporting in PSAK is to provide information about the company's financial condition, performance, and financial trends, relevant to various users in the decision-making process and as a form of management accountability for rights vested in it by shareholders. The financial statements produced by the company will serve as a basis for decision-making by outside parties. Thus, as there is a broad interest in financial statements, the information presented in financial statements must be accurate, reliable, trustworthy, and not misleading, to meet the needs of each stakeholder. In this context, the role of the auditor is essential in producing reliable and valid financial statements.

Auditors must be objective and independent about the information presented by management. This aims to improve the reliability and quality of the company's financial statements. Independence is the impartial quality of an auditor. According to IAPI (2012), SPAP 220 states that accountant independence is not easily influenced by the public interest. Specifically, independence distinguishes between true and apparent independence. True independence is a characteristic of the auditor, which requires honesty in examining the facts and can be impartial in giving an opinion. Apparent independence, however, is an auditor characteristic, which can be held accountable for their independent actions during the audit process. This is reflected in the audience's appearance and the impression they create on the public. Auditors must maintain public confidence in the accounting profession by maintaining independence, integrity, and objectivity.

Auditor turnover has been found to affect reporting reliability and the costs of follow-up management services, which are expected to affect the quality of audit results. As a result, many countries have introduced auditor switching policies. The evolving issue of auditors began with the bankruptcy of one of the five largest US accounting firms, Arthur Anderson. Arthur Anderson failed to secure independence for his client, Enron. The 2001 Enron scandal required a change of auditors, or a change



of auditors, so that client companies could maintain the reliability of their reports and the independence of their auditors.

Accounting scandals in recent years have provided further evidence of auditing errors, with serious consequences for the business community and the emergence of a crisis of public confidence in the auditing profession. Auditors have come under public scrutiny for allegedly conspiring to manipulate information and sacrifice the interests of the general public for the benefit of a select few. In 2018, Indonesia faced a similar situation, with the new management of PT Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk changing its audience. Previously, the firm had hired auditors Amir Abadi Jusuf, Aryanto, and Mawar, only to be replaced by Ernst & Young (EY). This was due to negative findings in the 2017 audit report of the AISA Retail Investor Forum (Forsa), as well as repeated delays in releasing audited financial statements. These irregularities were reflected in the 2017 financial statements relating to material and affiliated transactions. Affiliate transactions were not approved by independent shareholders and were excluded as third-party transactions. This was not disclosed to auditors Amir Abadi Jusuf, Ariyanto, and Mawar. The Ministry of Finance imposes penalties for violations of accounting and auditing standards based on the Code of Professional Ethics (As'ad and Nofryanti, 2021).

The Indonesian government has mandated the change of auditor to protect the integrity of a company's accounts and the auditor's independence. In order to maintain the independence of auditors, the Indonesian government has promulgated regulations governing auditor reform through Regulation No. 20/2015 of the Government on Public Accounting Practices, which establishes that certified public accountants (CPAs) are no longer limited to performing corporate audits. This prohibition applies only to auditors who have provided audit services on historical financial information for the same company for five consecutive years. Thereafter, auditors are required to undergo a consecutive two-year cooling-off period. Auditors can return to providing audit services to the company after the cooling off period has expired.

The company can change the audience either forcefully or voluntarily. Public provisions (PP) on change of auditors make it mandatory for companies to change auditors. This includes mandatory auditor changes. Voluntary auditor changes, however, occur due to various circumstances and reasons, originating from the client firm or competent audit firm (CAP), outside the applicable laws. Auditor changes by firms are inextricably linked to the factors that influence them. Several factors influence auditor change, including audit opinion, firm size, and the financial crisis (Rahmi et al. 2019).



Audit opinions are an important source of information for users of financial statements and outside parties to be considered. Generally, companies expect a non-qualified audit opinion (WTP). The more willing the auditor is to provide an audit opinion that differs from the client's expectations, the more likely the firm will change or replace auditors. Research by Sinaga et al. (2021) and Rahmi et al. (2019) show that audit opinions have a significant impact on auditor turnover. Research by Deliana et al. (2021) found no evidence that audit opinion affects auditor turnover.

According to Fauziyah et al. (2019), financial distress is a situation in which a company is unable to meet its financial obligations. Companies facing financial distress tend to increase subjective and conservative auditor assessments, leading to a tendency to switch to a higher quality auditor than before. Research by Manto and Wanda (2018) showed that financial distress affects auditor turnover. Research by Deliana et al. (2021) and Fauziyah et al. (2019) found no evidence that auditor change is affected by financial distress.

Firm size is defined as a reflection of the activities carried out within the firm, which influence its size (Rahmi et al., 2019). Larger firms tend to have more clients, which can increase the amount of agency disputes and thus the demand for audit quality. Research by Aini and Yahya (2019) showed that firm size affects audience turnover. In contrast, the Sinaga et al. (2021) and Hamdani and Hartati (2019) found no evidence that firm size affects auditor turnover.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Based on the theoretical evidence, a shift in the role of the auditor is based on agency theory. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), in this theory, the shareholders are considered as the principal and the management is the agent. A board is a body charged by shareholders with the responsibility of working together to manage the affairs of the company. The CEO provides resources and financing for the company's operations, while the agent acts as the CEO, responsible for improving the CEO's welfare by increasing the value of the company assigned to them by the shareholders.

Agency problems often arise from conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between managers and managers. Management has more information about the company than directors, so managers have a moral responsibility to optimize the interests of shareholders (directors). On the other hand, managers also aim to maximize their own welfare and interests, so agents may not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).



Agency problems, which often arise due to conflicts of interest between shareholders and directors, can lead to management changes. Shareholders are confident that the management changes, adopted at the General Shareholders' Meeting (AGM), will meet their aspirations, as the new management will adopt different accounting policies from those of the previous management. The new management is also confident that the independent auditors will work together to provide the recommendations that the new management expects. Agency theory, which prioritizes self-interest, leads shareholders to expect managers to optimize financial performance, as evidenced by an unqualified audit opinion issued by an independent auditor.

Agency theory is related to firm size. As the company grows in size, it becomes increasingly difficult for the owners to monitor the activities of the directors as directors and agents. This leads managers, like agents, to choose auditors who are more visible to their perspectives and who may also select higher quality auditors, as they are perceived to meet the needs of both directors and agents. Directors need auditors to verify the information provided by managers to the company. Management needs auditors to produce reliable financial reports.

Agency theory is also relevant to financial crises. The amount of agency fees is determined by the client based on the number of audit tasks performed. High monitoring costs can lead to financial crises for the company, which encourages companies to avoid changing auditors, as changing auditors will also increase agency costs. Monitoring costs are the costs incurred in monitoring, measuring, evaluating, and controlling agent behavior. Examples of compliance costs include audit fees, management compensation, and business rules. Agency costs, on the other hand, are costs resulting from competition between client and agent. Agency costs are divided into two categories: direct agency costs and indirect agency costs (Prawibowo & Juliarto, 2014).

In agency theory, independent auditors act as mediators between two parties (agents and directors) with different interests. Independent auditors also help reduce agency costs arising from agents' (managers') self-interest behavior.

## **RESEARCH METHOD**

This research is quantitative with an associative approach. This is because the data used are numerical data from financial reports, which are then processed using statistical analysis tools to answer the proposed hypothesis. The associative approach aims to identify the relationship between two or more variables.

The research design of this study is a causal relationship, in which the research variables are correlated or independent, or are significant (Sugiyono, 2018). In line with this definition, the purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis and explain the



relationship between the studied variables, namely, firm size, audit opinion, and financial distress as independent variables, and dependent variable, specified by auditor change implementation.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Descriptive statistical test

The results of the descriptive statistical tests on the independent and dependent variables are reported in the following table:

**Table 1.**  
**Company Size and Financial Constraints**

Descriptive statistics						
	N	Minimum minimum	Maximum a lot	Mean	The Standard Deviation	Differences in people
The size of the company	155. It is very important	24 570	33,256 people	29.51037	1.949528	3,801
financial difficulties	155. It is very important	-1,820 coins	472,410 people	7 12439 people	42.189961	1779,993
Valid N (list by list)	155. It is very important					

Source: Processed Data (2025)

1. These variables can be X1 of independence, ie measure company, has mean value (average) 29.51 per sign positive deviation (deviation). of 1.95 and value the variance in between of 3.80. The proportion involved measure board longer than the this is equal to 33.26 in total which may be Rp. 277,184,000,000,000.00 to Telkom Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. by 2021, however for its proportion small business size this is equal to 24.57 in total for the sum of Rp. 46,840,047,800.00 to the company blue energy giant It will be confirmed in 2020.
2. These variables can be independent X3, ie financial difficulties, has sign the minimum was -1.82 in 2020 by the company Acset that is inside Indonesia Tbk on the value The highest (highest) value was 472.41 in 2020 at Gihon Telekomunikasi Indonesia. The mean (average) value is of of 7.12 and sign positive deviation (deviation). of 42.19 and value the variance in between for the equivalent of 1779.99.



**Table 2.**  
**Look Again at the Ideas**

		Frequency	Percentages and percentages	This percentage is valid	Cumulative percentage
Positive	In addition to receiving an unconditional opinion	1. It is very important	,6	,6	,6
	Take an open mind	154. It is very important	99.4	99.4	100.0.0
	Whole	155. It is very important	100.0.0	100.0.0	

Source: Processed Data (2025)

It is based on Table 2 shows That potential variables X2 independent, ie the concept of review exists nominal variables using dummy variables contain valid data because All be done. This company gets unbiased assessment concepts miss except about 154 companies or the other 99.4% among them, that is Nusantara Infrastructure Company Tbk ., Mora Telematika Indonesia Tbk., and Mega Power Makmur Tbk. The full list is as follows: board Candy see the bond while the recipient audit opinion differs from reasonable miss except up to 1 company or 0.6%, ie PP Precision To be confirmed 2020.

**Table 3.**  
**Change of Auditor**

		Frequency	Percentages and percentages	This percentage is valid	Cumulative percentage
Positive	No change of audience	82. It is very important	52.9	52.9	52.9
	Auditor change execution	73. It is very important	47.1	47.1	100.0.0
	Whole	155. It is very important	100.0.0	100.0.0	

Source: Processed Data (2025)



It is based on table 3 is sufficient described That potential variables dependent, ie auditor change, is potential variables nominal scale using the dummy variable , location these companies make an auditor code change "1" when companies that do not make auditor changes assigned code "0", contains valid data for all the data has been set done . 73 companies changed auditors or approximately 47.1% . among them , that is board Cardig Aero Services Tbk . 2018 to 2021 and Net Link Tbk . 2019 and 2020. While those who don't making auditor change for 82 companies or approximately 52.9% . among them , that is Inti Bangun Sejahtera Tbk . the 2017, 2019 and 2020, and the XL Axiata Tbk . from 2017 to 2021. The full list is as follows : companies that do and don't make changes auditors can see the attachment .

**Past Recruitment Test**

**Logistic regression analysis**

The results of the normality test in this study can be seen in the following image: In this study, logistic regression analysis was performed to test whether the independent variables, namely firm size (X1), audit opinion (X2), and financial crisis (X3), influence the dependent variable, namely auditor change (Y). The logistic regression analysis model used in this study is as follows:

$$AS = a + \beta_1 UP + \beta_2 OA + \beta_3 FD + \epsilon$$

Information:

- AS = Auditor change
- SU = Size of the company
- OA = Audit Opinion
- FD = Financial Difficulty
- y = It is always available
- $\beta_1... \beta_3$  = Regression coefficient
- $\epsilon$  = Error or Error r

**Table 4.**  
**The Variables in the Equation**

	B	IF	Wild	df	M	Exp (B) and .	95% CI for EXP (B) .	
							The Lowly Man	Superior
<b>The size of the company</b>	-,015	,085	,029	1. It is very important	,865	,986	,834	1,165



<b>Look again at the ideas</b>	-21,3	401 92.5 87	,000,0	1. It is very important	1,00 0	,000,0	,000,0	- .
<b>financial difficulties</b>	,002	,004	,258	1. It is very important	,612	1,002	,994	1,011
<b>Constant</b>	21,62 9 people	401 92.5 87	,000,0	1. It is very important	1,00 0	2474830 464 through 2474830 464		

Source: Processed Data (2025)

Based on Table 4.5, the resulting logistic regression model is as follows:

$$AS = 21.629 - 0.015UP - 21.346OA + 0.002FD + \theta$$

The constant variable in the logistic regression model has a coefficient of 21.629, indicating that if we ignore the coefficients of the variables related to firm size, audit opinion, and financial distress, the firm's desire to switch auditors increases by 21.629. The regression coefficient of firm size (X1) is -0.015, where there is a negative coefficient between firm size and audience switching, which means that for every 100% increase in firm size variable, the firm will not switch audiences and the willingness to switch audiences decreases by 1.50%.

The regression coefficient of audit opinion (X2) is -21.346, where there is a negative coefficient between audit opinion and auditor change, which means that for every 100% increase in firm size variable, auditor change will not happen in the firm and willingness to change auditor decreases by 2134.60%.

The regression coefficient of financial crisis (X3) is 0.002, where is the coefficient between audit opinion and auditor change, which means that for every 100% increase in financial crisis variable, firm-based auditor change and willingness to change auditor will increase by 0.20%.

**Full Model Fit Test**

According to Ghozali (2018), "the first step is to assess the overall fit of the model to the data." To verify this, several statistical tests are performed. The assumptions used to assess model fit are as follows:

H0 = Hypothesized model fits data

Ha = Hypothesized model does not fit data



The statistics used are based on a likelihood function. The probability L of a model is the probability that the hypothesized model describes the input data. To test the null and alternative hypotheses, L is transformed to -2LogL. A decrease in likelihood (-2LL) indicates a good regression model, or in other words, a good fit of the hypothesized model to the data. This can be done by comparing the probability value (-2LL) at the beginning (block number = 0) with the probability value (-2LL) at the end (block number = 1). as follows:

Table 5. Block 0: Initial Block

Repetition		-2 Logarithmic Probability	Constant Coefficients
Step 0. Very important	1. It is very important	Population 214,3	-,116
	2. It is very important	Population 214,3	-,116

Source: Processed Data (2025)

It is based on the picture above Candy he concluded That point, point, point spread up and down the number 0 on the Y- axis and the no module model, because in study That NO occur heteroskedasticity.

Table 6. Block 1: Method = Send

Repetition		-2 Logarithmic probability	The coefficients of the coefficients			
			Constant	The size of the company	Look again at the ideas	Financial Difficulties
Section	1. It is very important	212,721 people	2,433 people	-,015	-2,143	,002
	2. It is very important	212,552 people	3,562 people	-,015	-3,279	,002
	3. It is very important	212,497 people	4,605	-,015	-4,322	,002



4. It is very important	Population 212,4	5,621	-,015	-5,388	,002
5. It is very important	212,471 people	6,626 people	-,015	-6,343	,002
6. It doesn't matter	212,468 people	7,628 people	-,015	-7,345	,002
7. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	8 629	-,015	-8,346	,002
8. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	9 629	-,015	-9,346	,002
9. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	10,629	-,015	-10,346	,002
10. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	11,629 people	-,015	-11,346	,002
11. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	12,629 people	-,015	-12,3	,002
12. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	13,629 people	-,015	-13,346	,002
13. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	14,629 people	-,015	-14,3	,002
14. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	15,629 people	-,015	-15,346	,002
15. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	16,629 people	-,015	-16,346	,002



16. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	17,629 people	-,015	-17,3	,002
17. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	18,629 people	-,015	-18,346	,002
18. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	19,629 people	-,015	-19,346	,002
19. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	20 629	-,015	-20,3	,002
20. It doesn't matter	212,467 people	21,629 people	-,015	-21,3	,002

Source: Processed Data (2025)

Tables 5 and 6 show a comparison of the results of the likelihood ratio (-2LL) calculation. It can be seen that the value of the first block (Block 0) is 214,353, while the value of the last block (Block 1) is 212,467. Therefore, as the likelihood ratio decreases from 214.353 to 212.467, we conclude that H0 is accepted, which means that the regression model used is a good fit for the data.

**Regression Model Fit Test (Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test)**

The adequacy of the regression model was assessed using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test tests the null hypothesis that the empirical data are consistent with the model (there is no difference between the model and the data, so it can be said that the model is consistent with the model). The results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test are shown in Table 4.8 as follows:

**Table 7.  
Hosmer and Lemeshow test**

Take a step	The chi-square is	Df	M
1. It is very important	3,275	8. It doesn't matter	,916

Source: Processed Data (2025)



Based on the table above, the chi-square value is 3.275 with a significance level of 0.916 and a ΔF of 8. From these results, it can be seen that the significance level of 0.916 is > 0.05 (5%), so the null hypothesis is accepted, meaning no difference between predicted and observed classifications. Thus, the logistic regression model used met the criteria for adequacy (fit) of the data.

**Coefficient of determination test (Nagelkerke's R-square) .**

According to Ghozali (2018), the Cox and Snell R-square is a measure that attempts to mimic the R-square in multiple regression based on probability estimation techniques, with a maximum value less than 1 (one), making it difficult to interpret. A low Nagelkerke R-squared value indicates that the ability of the independent variables to explain the difference in the dependent variable is very limited. A value close to one indicates that the independent variables provide almost all the information needed to predict the variation of the dependent variable. The Nagelkerke R-squared results are reported in Table 8 as follows:

**Table 8.**  
**Nagelkerke Rd**

Take a step	-2 Logarithmic probability	Cox & Snell R Place	Nagelkerke Rd
1. It is very important	212 467 b	,012	,016

Source: Processed Data (2025)

According to Table 8, the Nagelkerke R-squared value is 0.016, and when expressed as a percentage, it becomes 1.60%. This means that the dependent variability, cad, auditor change (Y), can be explained by the independent variability, cad, firm size (X1), audit opinion (X2), and financial crisis (X3), which can explain only 1.60%, while the remaining 98.4% is explained or influenced by other factors outside the research model.

**Testing hypotheses**

**Practice There is a half**

A partial test was conducted to determine the effect of each independent variable, namely, firm size (X1), audit opinion (X2), and financial distress (X3), on the dependent variable, namely, auditor change (Y). The results of the data analysis in this study are reported in Table 4.10 as follows:

**Table 9.**

	B	IF	Wild	df	M
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<b>The Size of the Company</b>	-,015	,085	,029	1. It is very important	,865
<b>Look again at the ideas</b>	-21,3	40192.587	,000,0	1. It is very important	1,000
<b>Financial Difficulties</b>	,002	,004	,258	1. It is very important	,612
<b>Constant</b>	21,629 people	40192.587	,000,0	1. It is very important	1,000

Source: Processed Data (2025)

Based on Table 4.10, a partial test of the independent variable can be concluded as follows:

**The effect of firm size on auditor switching**

The firm size variable has a significance value of 0.865 (sig 0.865 > alpha 0.05), so we can conclude that firm size (X1) has no influence on auditor switching (Y). This implies that firm size does not influence auditor switching. The results of this study confirm those of Yusriwati (2019), who found that firm size has no effect on auditor turnover. In this case, the researchers argue that company size has no effect on auditor turnover. This is because high performance and large corporate operations can still be managed by a former auditor. The results of this study contradict the findings of research conducted by Aini and Yahya (2019), according to which company size has a significant effect on audience turnover.

**The influence of audit opinion on auditor change**

The audit opinion variable has a significance value of 1,000 (sig 1,000 > alpha 0.05), it can be concluded that audit opinion (X2) has no influence on auditor switching (Y). This means that these companies obtain an audit opinion An unqualified opinion does not always have an effect on an accountant's change.

The results of this study support the findings of research conducted by Augustivena & Wilopo (2017) and Deliana et al. (2021), which finds that audit opinions do not affect auditor turnover. In this context, researchers argue that an audit opinion received by a company is not always followed by the auditor. This is also supported by the results of the descriptive analysis, which indicated that the majority of the sampled firms received insufficient opinion, but many firms simply switched audiences. The findings of the study suggest that the driving factors for companies to change auditors are not the opinion received by the company, but rather other factors that cause companies to change auditors even if the opinion received is favorable. This



means that the opinion taken by the company cannot guarantee a change of auditor. This is because management and auditors will need more time to understand and adjust to the new situation. Therefore, when a company gets the wrong idea, it will not change the auditors.

The results of this study differ from the results of the research conducted by Muaqilah et al. (2021) and Yusriwati (2019), according to which audit opinion affects the change of auditors.

### **The impact of financial distress on auditor change**

The financial distress variable has a significance value of 0.612 (sig 0.612 > alpha 0.05), so it can be concluded that financial distress (X3) has no influence on listener switching (Y). This means that the financial difficulties faced by the company are not a factor in changing the auditors. The findings of this study support the findings of research conducted by Aini & Yahya (2019) and Yusriwati (2019), according to which financial distress has no influence on listener switching. Researchers say the financial problems faced by companies are not always accompanied by changes in auditors.

This is also supported by the results of the descriptive analysis, which show that most of the firms sampled in this study are not in good financial condition or facing financial difficulties, but in fact, many firms have simply changed audiences. Thus, it can be seen that financial constraints are not a determinant of auditor change. This could be influenced by other factors not addressed in this study. this research. This means that financial constraints cannot encourage companies to substitute The Finance Officer. Since the initial costs incurred by the company in finding a new auditor are very high, the company prioritizes improving its financial position.

The results of this study contradict the findings of research conducted by Manto & Wanda (2018) and Muaqilah et al., (2021) who reported that financial distress has a significant effect on listener switching.

### **One-Time Test**

A simultaneous test was conducted to determine whether all independent variables (firm size, audit opinion, and financial distress) influence simultaneously the dependent variable, namely auditor change. To determine the results of a simultaneous test, refer to the Model Coefficient Omnibus Tests table, as shown in Table 4.11 below:



**Table 10.**  
**A One-Time Test**

	The chi-square is	df	M
<b>Take a step</b>	1,886	3. It is very important	,596
<b>Caught</b>	1,886	3. It is very important	,596
<b>Model</b>	1,886	3. It is very important	,596

Source: Processed Data (2025)

Based on Table 10 above, the chi-square result is 1.886 with a significance coefficient of 3 and a significance level of 0.596, which is greater than 0.05 (sig 0.596 > alpha 0.05). This suggests that firm size, audit opinion, and financial distress do not have a direct effect on auditor change.

### CONCLUSION

This study aims to determine the effect of firm size, audit opinion, and financial crisis on auditor change in infrastructure firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 to 2021. The sample for this study consisted of 31 firms, with a total of 155 observational data points regression logistics. Based on the results of the analysis described in the previous chapter.

1. The variable of firm size (X1) has no effect on the change in auditor (Y) in infrastructure firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period 2017-2021.
2. The audit opinion (X2) has no effect on the change of auditor (Y) on infrastructure companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2017-2021.
3. Financial distress (X3) has no effect on auditor change (Y) in infrastructure companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange in 2017-2021.
4. The variables related to firm size, audit opinion and financial distress did not have a simultaneous effect on auditor change (Y) in infrastructure companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange over the period 2017-2021.

This means that the size of the company, the audit opinion received, and the financial constraints faced by the company may not justify or encourage the company to change auditors. This study also has several limitations, as follows:

1. Several companies were excluded from the sample due to incomplete information, such as the failure to publish complete and continuous financial statements from 2011 to 2015 and the use of foreign currencies in the financial statements by some



companies. Furthermore, this study only used infrastructure companies as its population, so the results cannot be generalized to other companies.

2. The data used to identify firms that switch audiences do not distinguish between firms that switch audiences mandatorily and firms that switch audiences voluntarily.

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